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Tiivistelmä 
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan työehtosopimuksissa määräytyvien alimpien taulukko-
palkkojen vaikutuksia palkkajakaumaan ja työllisyyteen vähittäiskaupan alalla. Ai-
neistona käytetään EK:n yksityisten palvelualojen palkka-aineistoa vuosilta 1990-
2005. Tähän aineistoon on liitetty työehtosopimuksiin perustuvat kaupan alan vähim-
mäispalkat. Tutkimuksessa käytetään hyväksi erityisesti niitä poikkeuksia, joita vä-
himmäispalkkoihin sovittiin työmarkkinaosapuolten kesken 1990-luvun puolivälissä. 
Vuosina 1993-1995 oli mahdollista maksaa työehtosopimuksessa sovittua tauluk-
kopalkkaa matalampaa palkkaa alle 25-vuotiaille nuorille. Tulosten perusteella nuoria 
koskevilla poikkeuksilla ei ollut vaikutuksia työllisyyteen, vaikka niillä olikin jonkin 
verran vaikutuksia todellisuudessa maksettuihin palkkoihin erityisesti palkkajakau-
man alapäässä. 
 
Abstract 
Following an agreement between the trade unions and the employer organisations, 
Finnish employers could pay less than the existing minimum wage for young workers 
between 1993 and 1995. We examine the effects of these minimum wage exceptions 
by comparing the changes in wages and employment of the groups whose minimum 
wages were reduced with simultaneous changes among slightly older workers for 
whom the minimum wage regulation was still binding. Our analysis is based on the 
payroll record data and minimum wage agreements from the retail trade sector over 
the period 1990-2005. We discover that average wages in the eligible group declined 
only modestly despite the fact that the excess supply of labour during high 
unemployment should make it relatively easy to attract workers even with low wages. 
The minimum wage exceptions had no positive effects on employment. 
 
JEL Codes: J31, J51 
This paper contains 6764 words. 
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1. Introduction 
The negative employment effects of minimum wages were taken granted for decades 
(e.g. Stigler 1946; Brown et al. 1982). Only in the 1990s was this consensus view 
challenged. In their influential book Card and Krueger (1995) argued that the existing 
evidence of the minimum wage effects was questionable. They showed that minimum 
wage increases often had no negative employment effects and sometimes the effects 
were positive. Considerable debate about the relevance of the new view remains, 
however (Neumark and Wascher 2006). The effects of minimum wages on youth 
employment are subject to a similar controversy. Some studies find large negative 
employment effects due to the increases in minimum wages (e.g. Abowd et al. 2000; 
Pereira 2003), while other studies report considerable positive effects (e.g. Portugal 
and Cardoso 2006; Hyslop and Stillman 2007).  
This paper evaluates the effects of minimum wages on youth wages and employment 
in Finland. The empirical analysis is based on a union agreement that allowed 
employers to pay less than the minimum wage to workers who were below 25 years 
of age and had at most one year’s work experience. Hence, in contrast to many recent 
studies that have considered the effects of increases in minimum wages the Finnish 
policy involved a temporary decrease in the minimum wage. This subminimum youth 
wage policy was effective between 1993 and 1995 at the time of severe recession in 
the Finnish economy. The policy intended to boost employment among the groups 
that were most likely to be affected by high minimum wages. In this paper, we 
analyse the effects of the policy by comparing the changes in wages and employment 
of the group whose minimum wages were reduced with simultaneous changes among 
slightly older workers for whom the minimum wage regulation was still binding. 
We focus on the retail trade sector, because it is a low-wage industry, where one 
could expect to discover negative employment effects stemming from minimum 
wages. Moreover, the turnover of the workforce is high and part-time work is very 
common, which could help firms to achieve desired changes in employment quickly 
(Brown 1999). 
Finland does not have statutory minimum wage laws. Instead, minimum wages are 
determined in the contracts between the unions and the employer organisations.1 
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These contracts are extended to all workers in the sector and are therefore also 
binding for non-union workers. Owing to the extension of union-bargained minimum 
wages to all workers the employment effects of the minimum wage contracts could be 
quite similar to the effects of statutory minimum wage laws. An interesting difference 
is that the union contracts do not specify a single minimum wage but a set of task-
specific minimum wages. The minimum provisions vary across regions and the 
contracts contain clauses on how minimum wages depend on seniority. In this sense, 
the Finnish minimum wage system closely resembles the Swedish and Norwegian 
systems (Askildsen et al. 2000; Skedinger 2006). Union bargaining over minimum 
wages is not uncommon elsewhere either. For example, those seven EU countries that 
do not have statutory minimum wages have all established a tradition of minimum 
wages set by collective bargaining, often at the sectoral level. Even in countries with 
statutory minimum wages the social partners may have a direct or a consultative role 
in minimum wage adjustments (Eurofound 2007).    
The evidence on the effects of union-negotiated minimum wages is sparse. Only one 
out of 86 studies that are cited by Neumark and Wascher (2006) considers the effects 
in the system with negotiated minimum wages. Skedinger (2007) argues that the 
union-bargained minimum wage system is interesting, because the negative effects of 
minimum wages can be larger or smaller, compared with the countries with statutory 
minimum wage legislation, depending on how well the unions are able to assess what 
a relevant market-clearing wage for unskilled workers is. The variation in the 
minimum wage across workers and the changes in the minimum wage that affect only 
some workers also help in studying the effects of the minimum wages. Skedinger 
(2006) uses this strategy and finds that the increases in the minimum wages have had 
significant negative effects on employment in Sweden.2  
Our analysis is based on the payroll record data and minimum wage agreements for 
the period 1990-2005. To preview the results, we show that the minimum wages 
fundamentally shape wage distribution in the Finnish retail trade sector. There is a 
clear spike in wage distribution at the minimum rate and missing mass below that 
point. Still, we find that relaxing the minimum wage regulation for young workers 
had only a minimal impact on the actual wages. We find no positive employment 
effects.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutions and the structure of 
negotiated minimum wages. Section 3 explains the minimum wage exceptions for 
young workers during 1993-1995. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 contains 
our analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Finnish labour relations and minimum wages  
Description of Institutions  
Wage bargaining in Finland involves a high degree of co-ordination between the different 
unions and the employer organisations. A framework agreement is typically negotiated 
centrally between the union and employer federations on a one- or two-year basis. After 
central agreement has been reached, the individual unions and the respective employer 
organisations bargain over wages separately in each industry. These contracts determine a 
general wage increase applied to all wages and a wage schedule determining a minimum 
pay in each task. The industry-specific collective labour agreements are also binding for 
the non-union members in the industries where the union contract is “representative”. 
This is assessed by a specific institution, the Board for Ratification of the Validity of 
Collective Agreements and the Labour Court. They have considered a contract to be 
representative when at least half of the workers in the industry are union members. Since 
union density is about 70 per cent, most industries have a representative contract. 
Consequently, the coverage of collective agreements is around 95% of all workers, one of 
the highest rates among the OECD countries (Layard and Nickell 1999). 
In the retail trade sector union density has declined rapidly but it was still about 55 per 
cent in 2000 (Böckerman and Uusitalo 2006: 292). Minimum wages in the retail trade 
are based on collective agreements between the Service Union United (PAM) and the 
Federation of Finnish Commerce (formerly the Commercial Employers’ Association). 
These minimum wages determine the lowest possible wage for each task in the retail 
trade sector. Employers can naturally pay more than the minimum, and the average 
wages are generally higher than the minimum rates. It is also possible that local 
agreement in a firm leads to lower wage increases than the national union contract. 
Under the current law, local agreements on wage increases are legally binding only if 
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their terms exceed the minimum terms in national contracts. Consequently, the 
minimum conditions cannot be repealed by the conduct of local negotiations.  
The Structure of Minimum Wages in the Retail Trade Sector 
In the retail trade sector task-specific minimum wages vary by region, the job-
complexity level and the worker’s experience. The collective agreements specify 
wages separately in three geographical regions. The aim is to compensate for the 
regional differences in the cost of living. Minimum wages are highest in the Helsinki 
metropolitan area (cost-of-living index region I) and lower in the cost-of-living index 
regions II and III. The cost of living classification used in the contracts is mainly 
based on the 1980 price-level estimates by Statistics Finland. These estimates 
attempted to capture regional differences in commodity prices and housing costs 
(Lehtonen et al. 1983). Even though these price-level estimates are obviously out of 
date, the classification has proved to be hard to change. In fact, some municipalities 
are still classified into a higher cost-of-living category based on even older data from 
the cost of living study done in 1974 (Lind et al. 1975). 
In addition to regional variation, minimum wages depend on the job-complexity level 
and experience. In retail trade contracts there are six different job-complexity levels 
and four different experience levels (1st, 3rd, 5th and 8th year seniority increment) 
that determine minimum wages. These seniority increments are based on work 
experience in the retail trade sector, not only on tenure in the current firm. In this 
respect, the system in the Finnish retail sector is exactly the same as the one in 
Swedish hotels and restaurants described by Skedinger (2006). 
To illustrate the minimum wage structure in the retail trade sector, Figure 1 displays 
the minimum wages in terms of regions and the worker’s experience in 2000. The 
structure is largely similar in other years.3 In addition to the variation shown in Figure 
1, there are separate minimum wages for trainees that are 85% of the lowest rate in 
each region. All these aspects are taken into account when we analyse the effects of 
minimum wages. 
Figure 1 around here 
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Regarding the evolution of minimum wages over the period, it is important to note the 
Finnish economy went through a severe recession in the early 1990s. Output fell by 
14% in the years 1990-1993. The unemployment rate increased to almost 20% from 
an average of around 5% during the 1980s. Consequently, there were substantial 
pressures to increase flexibility in wage formation. Moreover, a national bargain 
between the unions and employer organizations imposed a wage ‘freeze’ in the years 
1992-1993 by extending the prevailing wage contracts.  
 
3. Minimum wage exceptions  
Because of macroeconomic difficulties, the right-wing government that was in power 
between 1991 and 1995 threatened to create new legislation to relax the minimum 
wage regulations for young workers. The aim of these plans was to improve 
employment opportunities for young workers during the times of high unemployment. 
To avoid legislative regulation and government involvement in wage bargaining the 
trade unions made an agreement with the employer organisations. Consequently, the 
minimum wages of young workers aged below 25 were temporarily reduced, based on 
a union agreement. There were minor differences in the exact content and the 
conditions of the exceptions between different sectors, because the agreements were 
negotiated separately for each industry. The agreement for the retail trade sector was 
signed on 7th June 1993. It was in force between 15th June 1993 and 15th June 1995.  
Based on this agreement, the minimum wages of workers younger than 25 were 
reduced to 80 per cent of the lowest task- and region-specific tariffs during their first 
year in the retail trade sector. Furthermore, the trainee wage was reduced from 85 to 
60 per cent of the lowest minimum wage prevailing in each region.  
The only earlier attempt to evaluate the effects of the 1993-1995 minimum wage 
exemptions was a telephone interview for a sample of 150 employers by Saari (1996). 
His study covered all sectors, not only low-wage service sectors where the negative 
effects of minimum wages are most likely to appear. Saari (1996) discovered that only 
two out of 150 employers interviewed had taken advantage of the minimum wage 
exemptions (i.e. paid a lower actual wage than the one stipulated in the collective 
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agreement). Therefore, Saari (1996) concludes that the exceptions did not have any 
economically significant effect on employers’ hiring decisions.  
 
4. Data  
Our data comes from the payroll records of the Finnish employers’ association. The 
data covers all private service sector workers in firms that are members of the 
association. Hence, it covers around half of all workers in the retail trade sector. The 
data provides information about monthly wages, weekly working time, and some 
information about workers’ individual characteristics such as age, gender and 
education. The data is detailed enough to identify all the factors that have an effect on 
the minimum wages for each person. This is quite natural, since one of the main 
purposes of collecting the data is to monitor wage growth after the union contract has 
been agreed upon. The data covers the situation during one month of each year 
(August before 1995 and October in and after 1995).  
The monthly rate is defined as the ‘personal wages paid for regular working time’. It 
includes such personal and ‘task’ specific bonuses (merit pay) that are paid at the 
same amount in each month. The monthly rate excludes performance-based payments, 
commissions, ‘profit sharing’ and similar payments. The monthly wage used is not 
simply a minimum wage based on contracted wage scales, but includes a significant 
person-specific component. The base wage excludes shift work, evening or Sunday 
bonuses that are paid at the same amount each month.  
Half of the persons employed in the retail sector work as part-time workers (i.e. work 
regularly at most 34 hours per week). The average weekly working time is around 30 
hours. Part-time work is much more common in the retail sector than in the labour 
market in general. According to the Labour Force Survey by Statistics Finland the 
share of part-time workers of all employees was 13% in 2005. Minimum wages are 
stipulated on a monthly basis in the collective labour agreements of the retail trade 
sector. For part-time workers, we construct a monthly wage by using the explicit 
formula that is stated in the collective agreements (full-time equivalent monthly wage 
= part-time worker’s current wage * (37.5 / part-time worker’s reported weekly 
working hours)).  
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We focus on two major occupational groups in the retail trade sector, which both 
consist of salespersons. Most of the workers (94%) in our data belong to the group of 
salespersons whose work does not require special professional expertise.4 A typical 
worker in the data is employed at the cash register in one of the retail business chains. 
Minimum wages are defined separately for these two groups in each year and they 
depend on region, the job-complexity level and the worker’s experience, as explained 
earlier.  
To avoid problems in defining the minimum rates for those that hold multiple jobs, 
we use information on the salespersons that have only one job (during the one-month 
interval of the data). These persons constitute around 99% of all available 
observations. The number of persons in the data each year varies according to the 
business cycle from around 30 000 to about 50 000. The total number of observations 
over the period is approximately 580 000. Minimum wages are collected from the 
collective agreements of the retail trade sector for each year and then linked to the 
payroll record data by using information on region, the job-complexity level and the 
worker’s experience.  
 
5. The effects of union-negotiated minimum wages 
Shaping the Wage Distribution 
The differences in percentages between actual nominal monthly wages paid by 
employers and the minimum monthly wages stipulated in the collective agreements 
for the years 19915, 1995, 2000 and 2005 are shown in Figures 2-3 by using two 
different wage concepts. The figures clearly show the effects of the minimum wage. 
There is a clear cut-off in the wage distribution at the minimum rate and missing mass 
below that point.  
Figures 2-3 around here 
Two additional points are worth noting. First, most of the workers receive actual 
wages that are only slightly above the minimum wages that are stipulated in the 
collective agreements. The pattern is in line with the findings by Jones et al. (2006) 
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that note the same by using the data from a Finnish retail firm. Second, there is a 
small number of observations below the minimum rate. The share of subminimum 
wages depends on the exact wage concept used. Strictly speaking, the minimum 
wages refer to the base wage. The share of subminimum wages is larger when the 
base wage is used (the average share is about 10% for the period). Their share is 
around 5% when one is using the wage concept in which shift work, evening or 
Sunday bonuses that are paid at the same amount each month are added to the base 
wages. Some employers may confuse the base wage with the wage rate that contains 
bonuses.6 There is evidence that in many cases when subminimum wages are 
observed by using only the base wage, employers have assigned a large sum to the 
bonuses that are separately reported in the payroll record data. We therefore prefer the 
wage concept that includes shift work, evening and Sunday bonuses.    
The remaining amount of subminimum wages is probably caused by the measurement 
error in regular weekly working hours. Moreover, it is possible that employers make 
mistakes when they classify their workers according to the job-complexity levels. The 
latter source seems to be less important, because the number of subminimum wages 
does not decrease much when the minimum wages are re-coded to the data without 
taking advantage of job-complexity levels (and workers’ experience) and using 
information only on their regional variation. Measurement errors in working hours are 
important, because part-time work is very common. Overall, most subminimum 
wages are only marginally less than the minimum rate.  
For comparison, Skedinger (2006: 271), using similar payroll record data for Swedish 
hotels and restaurants, reports that around one tenth of the observations have actual 
wages below the binding minimum wage. Consequently, the share of subminimum 
wages that we observe in the Finnish retail trade sector is of the same order of 
magnitude as the one reported by Skedinger (2006). As expected, both of these shares 
are significantly lower than the ones seen in household surveys that have often been 
used to examine the effects of minimum wages (e.g. Stewart and Swaffield 2002).  
The ‘Bite’ of Minimum Wages and Regional Variation 
Figure 4 shows that the minimum wages were somewhat more binding during the 
depression years in the early 1990s.7 The ‘bite’ of minimum wages tends to be weaker 
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for the youngest workers, because the minimum wages are lower for young workers 
that have less experience than older workers.8 This particular pattern is not necessarily 
common in the countries with statutory minimum wage legislation that specifies a 
single minimum rate. Moreover, the ratio of minimum wages to average wages for 
workers below age 25 declined drastically in 1993-1994 owing to the reduced 
minimum wages schemes during the years of exceptions.9 This also suggests that the 
cut in the minimum wage apparently did not substantially reduce average wages.  
Figure 4 around here 
It is interesting to study whether there appears additional regional variation in actual 
wages that is not directly related to the minimum wages, because unemployment is 
almost three times higher in some regions of Eastern and Northern Finland compared 
with the regions in Southern Finland (around the Helsinki metropolitan area). To shed 
light on this issue, we regress the logarithms of the minimum wages and the actual 
wages by using indicators for three separate cost-of-living index regions of the 
collective agreements as explanatory variables along with the control variables over 
the period 1990-2005.10 We find that regional variation in actual wages is larger than 
that in minimum wages. The level of actual wages and minimum wages is almost 
similar in the cost-of-living index region II, but in the Helsinki metropolitan area the 
actual wages are, on average, around 3% higher than the minimum rates, other things 
being equal. This shows that actual wages react to regional labour market conditions. 
Outcomes of the Minimum Wage Exceptions 
We study the effects of minimum wage exceptions by comparing the changes in 
wages and employment of the groups whose minimum wages were reduced to 
simultaneous changes among slightly older workers for whom the minimum wage 
regulation was still binding. We focus on the years 1991-1996, because the minimum 
wage exceptions were in force in our data in 1993-1994. When examining the wage 
effects, we restrict the data to workers below age 30 with a maximum of two years’ 
work experience to obtain a control group that would be as close a substitute as 
possible to two treatment groups (workers below age 25 and trainees) that were 
eligible for minimum wage exceptions in 1993-1994. 
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Figure 5 depicts the kernel density estimates for the distribution of actual nominal 
wages for 1992-1993 and 1994-1995. First, in the top left-hand panel, we show the 
wage distribution for workers below age 25 in 1992-1993. There was a small increase 
in the mass at the lower tail of the distribution in 1993, which suggests that minimum 
wage exceptions did have effects on actual wages. To illustrate this, the share of 
wages that were under 800 (€) increased from 0.85% to 2.5% in 1992-1993. The top 
right-hand panel shows the distribution for the control group (workers aged 25-30 
who had a maximum of two years’ work experience) in 1992-1993. Overall, the 
changes were minimal in 1992-1993. Both top panels are consistent with the fact that 
there was a wage ‘freeze’ in 1992-1993. The lower panels in Figure 5 show the wage 
distributions for the treatment group and the control group in 1994-1995. The picture 
that emerges for the treatment group in 1994-1995 is not as clean as for the period 
1992-1993, because there was a change in the interval of data collection in 1995 and 
the overall increase in wages in 1994-1995. For these reasons, the estimates regarding 
the decrease in the minimum wage in 1993 might be more reliable than the estimates 
regarding the increase in 1995. 
Figure 5 around here  
To quantify the effects of the minimum wage exceptions on actual wages and to 
assess their statistical significance, we report the levels and changes in wages among 
the treatment and the control groups in Table 1. The first nine cells on the top left 
corner report the average logarithm of wages in the period before (1991-1992), during 
(1993-1994) and after (1995-1996) the minimum wage exceptions. In the top right 
corner we report the changes in wages when minimum wage exceptions were 
introduced in 1993 and the changes in wages when these exceptions were removed in 
1995. We calculate these changes separately in two treatment groups (workers below 
age 25 and trainees) and in the control group. In the bottom right corner we report the 
differences in these changes. These difference-in-differences estimates capture the 
effect of the minimum wage exceptions on actual average wages.  
Table 1 around here 
According to our estimates the decrease in the minimum wage decreased the average 
wages among the young workers by 1 per cent compared to the older control group. 
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Similarly the removal of the minimum wage exceptions increased wages also by 1 per 
cent compared with the control group. Because the sample size is large, even these 
small effects are statistically significant. The effect is larger for trainees. The trainee 
wage decreased by seven per cent more than the control group wage after the 
introduction of minimum wage exceptions and increased by eight per cent after their 
removal. However, the absolute number of trainees is quite small, as shown in square 
brackets on the top left corner of Table 1. In the right-most column we report the 
differences in wages between the period before the minimum wage exceptions (1991-
1992) and the period after their removal (1995-1996). These estimates can be 
regarded as a specification test for the model. Significantly different changes over this 
period would imply that there have been different trends in the treatment and the 
control groups. Our estimates in the last column are very close to zero which validates 
the estimates for wage changes in the two previous columns.  
To check the robustness of the findings, we have incorporated covariates (gender, 
education, industry, and region) into the models. Furthermore, we have estimated the 
models separately for the new recruits, which consist of those that move to the retail 
trade sector from outside the sector. The share of new recruits of all workers is high, 
because the labour market is fluid in this sector. These specifications change our 
baseline results only marginally. The main difference is that the estimated standard 
errors are larger, especially in the models for the new recruits. Moreover, it is possible 
that the average estimates obtained by OLS conceal more significant effects in some 
parts of the wage distribution. For this reason, we have estimated the wage models by 
using quantile regression methods. We estimated similar difference-in-difference 
models explaining logarithm of wages by group dummies, year dummies and their 
interaction capturing the lower minimum wage for the youngest workers in 1993 and 
1994. We also included the covariates mentioned above. According to these results 
the minimum wage exceptions clearly had the largest effect on actual wages in the 
lowest wage quantile. This finding is consistent with Figure 5, according to which 
there was a small increase in the mass at the lower tail of the wage distribution in 
1993.  
To examine the potential employment effects of the minimum wage exceptions we 
aggregate the data to the firm level. Now we do not restrict the data to workers below 
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aged 30, but calculate the employment shares and the shares of hours worked by the 
treatment groups and the control group. Another difference to the wage regressions is 
that we weight our firm-level observations by the firm size. Otherwise, our difference-
in-differences estimates for employment effects are similar to earlier estimates for 
wage changes. 
In lower right corners of Table 2 we report weighted least squares estimates where we 
explain the employment share of the treatment and the control groups in the firm with 
time and group dummies and their interaction. The estimates in column titled “During 
– Before” are based on comparison of employment changes between the treatment 
and the control group when the minimum wages were reduced in 1993. Similarly the 
estimates in column titled “After – During” are based on employment changes that 
occurred when the minimum wage exceptions were removed in 1995 i.e. on an 
increase in the minimum wage among the youngest workers. Either of these estimates 
could be interpreted as an effect of minimum wage change and the setup can be 
compared to the earlier studies based on minimum wage changes affecting some 
particular group (e.g. Card and Krueger 1995; Portugal and Cardoso 2006; Hyslop 
and Stillman 2007). 
Table 2 around here 
Our estimates in column “During – Before” reveal that minimum wage cut seems to 
imply a decrease in employment in the affected groups. This result does not depend 
on whether we examine employment shares or the shares of hours worked nor on 
whether we examine workers below age 25 or trainees. These estimates are consistent 
with the positive employment effects of minimum wages rising, for example, from a 
monopsony model, as first argued by Card and Krueger (1995). 
However, the estimates reported in column “After – During” reveal that employment 
decreased also when the minimum wage exceptions were removed i.e. when 
minimum wages increased. Employment in the groups affected by the minimum wage 
increase decreased by 1.6 – 4.5 percentage points more than in the control group 
depending on whether we examine the shares of employed or hours worked and 
depending on which treatment group we examine. Given that wage changes reported 
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in Table 1 were relatively small this implies that increasing minimum wages has 
substantial adverse effects on employment.  
The contradictory findings are explained by the estimates in the right-most column 
where we compare the years 1991-1992 to the years 1995-1996. Apparently there has 
been a clear trend decreasing the employment of both treatment groups occurring 
simultaneously with the minimum wage changes. However, such trends are hard to 
detect with only one before-after comparison and short samples used in some earlier 
studies e.g. Card and Krueger (1995). 
We have performed several robustness checks and tried to take into account the 
different trends in employment in different groups. To save space, we report only the 
difference-in-difference estimates for the shares of hours worked (Table 3). Because 
the number of firms changed over the period 1991-1996 we have estimated the 
models separately for the firms that exist for the whole period 1991-1996. We have 
also estimated separate models for the new recruits trying to account for the effects of 
the decline in hiring rates during the depression years (e.g. Ilmakunnas and Maliranta 
2003). The results remain the same in these specifications.  
Table 3 around here 
Furthermore, we have estimated several different models for more restricted groups of 
new recruits by age. We report one specification in Table 3 in which we compare new 
recruits aged 24 with those new recruits aged 26. This is the only specification that 
passes our specification test and reveals no simultaneous group-specific trends. These 
estimates point to positive employment effects following the cut in minimum wages 
and to negative employment effects following a minimum wage increase. However, 
the quantitative magnitude of the estimates is small, and they are not statistically 
significant.  
The literature often argues that the effects of minimum wages are largest for teenagers 
(Neumark and Wascher 2004; 2006). For this reason, we have checked whether there 
are any positive effects among the very youngest workers (those with age less than 
20) that would be hidden in the aggregate numbers. The results do not change 
compared with the baseline model.  
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In addition to the models shown in Table 3, we have incorporated group-specific 
linear trends into the models. The results vary somewhat depending on the exact 
specification of the model, but the overall picture is that it is very hard to detect 
positive employment effects.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Following an agreement between the trade unions and the employers’ organisations, 
Finnish employers could pay less than the existing minimum wage for young workers 
for two years between 1993 and 1995. We examine the effects of these minimum 
wage exceptions by comparing the changes in wages and employment of the groups 
whose minimum wages were reduced with simultaneous changes among slightly older 
workers for whom the minimum wage regulation was still binding. We discover that 
average wages in the eligible group declined only modestly. We could not detect any 
positive effects on employment.  
At first sight, the findings for the minimum wage exceptions are somewhat surprising, 
given the prevailing macroeconomic situation. Excess supply of labour should have 
made it relatively easy to attract workers even with low wages. According to the LFS 
by Statistics Finland, the unemployment rate was 31% for workers aged 20-24 in 
1994. One explanation is that even in times of high unemployment employers were 
not willing to pay less than the old minimum, fearing that paying less than a fair wage 
would have adverse effects on effort. Experimental evidence supports this reasoning 
(Falk et al. 2006). Furthermore, the Finnish findings are consistent with Katz and 
Krueger (1992), who noted the low utilization of subminimum wages in a situation 
where employers could have paid less than the minimum rate. In particular, it may be 
difficult for firms to justify the payment of different wages for the same work for 
workers with different ages. Then a temporary reduction in minimum wages for the 
youngest workers does not cause significant changes in actual wages. This does not 
the rule out the possibility that the reduction of minimum wages across the board or a 
more permanent reduction in minimum wages would not have any effects. 
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TABLE 1. Difference-in-differences’ estimates of changes in wages  
 Before (1991-
1992) 
During (1993-
1994) 
After  
(1995-1996) 
Change (During – 
Before) 
Change (After – 
During) 
Change (After – 
Before) 
Average logarithm of wage 
25≤ Age ≤ 30 6.992 
(0.003) 
[3,120] 
 
6.997 
(0.003) 
[3,305] 
7.128 
(0.003) 
[3,616] 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.131 
(0.004) 
0.136 
(0.004) 
Age < 25 6.994 
(0.002) 
[11,237] 
6.988 
(0.002) 
[8,885] 
7.130 
(0.002) 
[8,394] 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
0.142 
(0.003) 
0.136 
(0.003) 
Trainees 6.967 
(0.009) 
[389] 
6.901 
(0.011) 
[292] 
7.111 
(0.007) 
[623] 
-0.066 
(0.017) 
0.210 
(0.016) 
0.144 
(0.015) 
Difference  
(Age<25) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.010 
(0.005) 
0.011 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
Difference  
(Trainees) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30)  
-0.025 
(0.010) 
-0.096 
(0.010) 
-0.016 
(0.008) 
-0.071 
(0.014) 
0.079 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
 
Note: The wage concept is the logarithm of actual nominal wage that consists of base wage added to shift work, evening or Sunday bonuses that are paid at the same amount 
each month. Estimated standard errors in parentheses; number of observations in square brackets. The numbers in the shadowed area are the difference-in-differences’ 
estimates. 
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TABLE 2. Difference-in-differences’ estimates of changes in employment and hours worked  
 Before (1991-
1992) 
During (1993-
1994) 
After  
(1995-1996) 
Change (During – 
Before) 
Change (After – 
During) 
Change (After – 
Before) 
Employment share 
25≤ Age ≤ 30 0.133 
(0.002) 
0.162 
(0.002) 
0.182 
(0.002) 
0.029 
(0.003) 
0.020 
(0.003) 
0.049 
(0.003) 
Age < 25 0.195 
(0.002) 
0.190 
(0.003) 
0.183 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.003) 
Trainees 0.055 
(0.001) 
0.030 
(0.001) 
0.033 
(0.001) 
-0.025 
(0.002) 
0.005 
 (0.002)  
-0.022  
(0.002) 
Difference  
(Age<25) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30) 
0.062 
(0.004) 
0.028 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.035 
(0.004) 
-0.027 
(0.005) 
-0.062 
(0.004) 
Difference  
(Trainees) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30)  
-0.078 
(0.002) 
-0.132 
(0.002) 
-0.149 
(0.002) 
-0.054 
(0.003) 
-0.016 
(0.003) 
-0.071 
(0.003) 
Share of hours worked 
25≤ Age ≤ 30 0.134 
(0.002) 
0.162 
(0.002) 
0.186 
(0.002) 
0.028 
(0.003) 
0.023 
(0.003) 
0.051 
(0.003) 
Age < 25 
 
0.178 
(0.002) 
0.169 
(0.002) 
0.147 
(0.002) 
-0.009 
(0.003) 
-0.022 
(0.003) 
-0.031 
(0.003) 
Trainees 0.040 
(0.001) 
0.022 
(0.001) 
0.019 
(0.001) 
-0.018 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.021 
(0.001) 
Difference  
(Age<25) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30) 
0.044 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
-0.038 
(0.003) 
-0.037 
(0.004) 
-0.045 
(0.005) 
-0.082 
(0.004) 
Difference  
(Trainees) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30) 
-0.094 
(0.002) 
-0.140 
(0.002) 
-0.167 
(0.002) 
-0.046 
 (0.003) 
-0.026 
(0.003) 
-0.072 
(0.003) 
       
Number of firms 6 524 5 510 4 670    
 
Note: Estimated standard errors in parentheses. The numbers in the shadowed area are the difference-in-differences’ estimates. 
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TABLE 3. Difference-in-differences’ estimates of changes in hours worked; additional specifications  
 Change (During – 
Before) 
Change  
(After – During) 
Change  
(After – Before) 
Continuing firms 1991-1996 
Difference  
(Age<25) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30) 
-0.032 
(0.006) 
-0.046 
(0.006) 
-0.078 
(0.006) 
Difference  
(Trainees) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30) 
-0.041 
(0.004) 
-0.026 
(0.004) 
-0.067 
(0.004) 
New recruits 
Difference  
(Age<25) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30) 
-0.040 
(0.009) 
-0.066 
(0.010) 
-0.106 
(0.008) 
Difference  
(Trainees) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30) 
-0.084 
(0.007) 
-0.042 
(0.007) 
-0.127 
(0.007) 
New recruits aged 24 vs. new recruits aged 26 
Difference  
(Age 24 – Age 26) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Age below 20 
Difference  
(Age<20) – (25≤ Age ≤ 30) 
-0.039 
(0.003) 
-0.026 
(0.003) 
-0.065 
(0.003) 
 
Note: Estimated standard errors in parentheses. The numbers in the shadowed area are the  
difference-in-differences’ estimates. 
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FIGURE 1. The level of minimum wages (€) in terms of regions and worker’s 
experience measured in years (1-2, 3-4, 5-7, and 8-) for the salespersons whose 
work does not require special professional expertise, for the year 2000.  
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FIGURE 2. The differences (%) between actual wages and task-specific 
minimum wages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The wage concept consists of the base wage only. The vertical line is at zero.  
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FIGURE 3. The differences (%) between actual wages and task-specific 
minimum wages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The wage concept consists of the base wage added to shift work, evening or Sunday bonuses that 
are paid at the same amount each month. The vertical line is at zero. 
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FIGURE 4. The ratio of minimum wages to average wages. 
 
Note: The wage concept consists of the base wage added to shift work, evening or Sunday bonuses that 
are paid at the same amount each month. 
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FIGURE 5. The wage distributions for the treatment group and the control 
group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The wage concept is the logarithm of the actual nominal wage that consists of the base wage 
added to shift work, evening or Sunday bonuses that are paid at the same amount each month. The 
treatment group consists of workers below age 25 and the control group consists of workers aged 25-30 
with a maximum of two years’ work experience. We have dropped 0.5% of the lowest and highest 
values.  
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1 There have been minimum wages in Finland as long as there have been collective agreements. The 
printers’ union negotiated the first collective agreements in the early 20th century. Collective 
agreements were not unusual before January 1940, when the employers formally recognized the unions 
for the first time (Bergholm 2005: 22-23). These contracts were not binding on non-members, however. 
 
2 There is almost no evidence of the effects of minimum wages in Finland. The only existing study 
(Sauramo and Solttila 1985) uses time-series data on youth employment shares and the ratio of 
minimum and average wages at the industry level. It finds no negative effects on youth employment. 
 
3 There have been some minor changes in the details of the system. There was an 11th year seniority 
increment in the years 1991-1999 that has not been applied in other years. Moreover, in the year 1990 
(the first year of our data) the classification of seniority increment was different from the rest of the 
years (including 1st, 4th, 6th and 8th year seniority increment). 
 
4 The results that are reported for the effects of minimum wage exceptions remain the same if we drop 
the group of salepersons whose work requires special professional expertise from the data, because 
very few young workers belong to this particular group.   
 
5 We use data from 1991 instead of 1990 because the wage increases agreed in the 1990 contract raised 
the minimum wages from October 1st 1990. The year 1990 was also the first year when the payroll 
record data was gathered. Therefore, the data from 1990 may contain more errors. 
 
6 Our discussions with the Finnish employers’ association support this conclusion.  
 
7 Previously, it has been estimated for all sectors that the ratio of minimum rates to average wages is 
moderate in Finland, i.e. 0.52 (Layard and Nickell 1999: 3043). The estimate is not based on micro-
level sources that would take into account all the relevant aspects in the determination of union-
negotiated minimum wages, however. 
 
8 We do not present separate ratios for trainees, because their number was rather small during the 
period 1993-1994. This is shown later in Table 1. 
 
9 We do not include the year 1995 in the years of minimum wage exceptions, because the exceptions 
ended on June 15th 1995 and the payroll record data for the year 1995 was gathered from the firms in 
October. 
 
10 The estimation results are available upon request. The industry classification that is available in the 
payroll record data refers to different retail trade chains. It does not correspond to the official industry 
classification that is used by Statistics Finland.  
